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MY BROTHER’S KEEPER: USING THE FOREIGN INT 
ELLIGENCE TOOLBOX ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Brandon Carmack 
“It is impossible to expel evil from the world in its entirety, but it is 
possible to constrict it within each person.” – Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I remember the morning of April 19, 1995. I was seven years old and 
confused by the rubble that consistently flashed across my television. 
Words like “Oklahoma City Bombing” hung in the air, and Timothy 
McVeigh became synonymous with evil. I remember the morning of 
September 11, 2001. I was thirteen years old and confused by the rubble 
that consistently flashed across my television. Words like “9/11” hung in 
the air, and Osama Bin Laden became synonymous with evil. 
Recent decades have forced the intelligence community to monitor 
pendulum shifts in various expressions of terrorism. The early nineties 
raised questions about foreign terrorism as Al-Qaeda took responsibility 
for attempted bombings at the World Trade Center. The mid-nineties 
1
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raised questions of domestic terrorism with the Oklahoma City Bombing. 
The pendulum returned to foreign terrorism after Al-Qaeda attacked U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and, of course, the World 
Trade Center in 2001. 
However, in the last five years, the pendulum of concern has once 
again swung to domestic terrorism.1 Mass shootings dominate the news 
cycle. Each violent episode gives rise to riveting discussions concerning 
gun violence in the United States. But rarely do these discussions consider 
how the United States’ current law enforcement infrastructure could be 
used to identify and prevent such tragedies. 
 Recent testimony to the House Homeland Security Committee 
indicates an increase in domestic terrorism incidents in recent years.2 In 
2013, Americans suffered twenty domestic terrorism incidents.3 In 2014, 
that number grew to twenty-nine.4 A smaller uptick occurred in 2015, 
reaching thirty-eight incidents.5 But by 2016, that number nearly doubled 
                                                     
1 See Adam Goldman, F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples with Limits on 
Its Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-
domestic-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/Y92Q-WLJT]. “The increase in [domestic 
terrorism] arrests marks something of a return to the 1990s, when the F.B.I. devoted 
significant resources to infiltrating and dismantling violent white supremacist and right-wing 
militia organizations from which lethal terrorists like David Lane and Timothy McVeigh 
emerged.” Id.  
2 See Michael C. McGarrity, Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland, 
FBI (May 8, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-the-rise-of-domestic-
terrorism-in-the-homeland [https://perma.cc/NR49-SMEH] (Statement Before the House 
Homeland Security Committee) (“We believe domestic terrorists pose a present and 
persistent threat of violence and economic harm to the United States; in fact, there have been 
more arrests and deaths caused by domestic terrorists than international terrorists in recent 
years.”). 
3 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013 Results, 





4 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2014 Results, 





5 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015 Results, 
UNIV. OF MD. GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&casualties_type=b&casualties_
2
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to sixty-seven.6 In 2017 and 2018, that number stayed nearly the same—
sixty-six7 and sixty-seven, respectively.8 
As a result of the alarming rise in domestic terrorism, we must ask 
whether the Constitution provides room for more government action 
against it. Policy leaders should begin by looking at various tools available 
to the foreign intelligence community to determine what might be legally 
permissible and practical in a domestic context. Obviously, not all foreign 
tools would be permissible for domestic use. For example, drone strikes 
on U.S. soil would violate constitutional due process (though the Justice 
Department has permitted drone strikes against U.S. citizens on foreign 
soil).9 But what about material support statutes or enhanced interrogation 
techniques? Each tool in the foreign intelligence community must 
maintain an independent legal basis for domestic application. This paper 
evaluates the constitutional limits of employing foreign surveillance 
techniques against domestic terrorism suspects. 
The Constitution shields the American citizen much differently than 
a foreign enemy combatant. Coupled with rapidly evolving technology, the 
prospect of enhanced government surveillance should cause discomfort 




6 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016 Results, 





7 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2017 Results, 





8 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2018 Results, 





9 See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTION TO CONTEMPLATED LETHAL OPERATIONS 
AGAINST SHAYKH ANWAR AL-AULAQI (July 16, 2010), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/aulaqi.pdf [https://perma.cc/385F-WX3G]. 
3
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and resistance. Americans have rightly favored their freedom over their 
security since the days of the American Revolution. But what if we could 
be slightly more secure without sacrificing freedoms? Is this possible? 
This paper argues that it is possible to strike such a balance. Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) already provides 
the structure for constitutionally enhancing surveillance against domestic 
terrorism suspects.10 However, while this proposal falls within the 
boundaries of the Constitution, political concerns likely prevent its 
adoption. Part II of this article provides an overview of Section 702 and 
outlines the proposed language for its domestic counterpart. Part III then 
analyzes the constitutional limits on that proposal. Finally, this article 
identifies and addresses the political limitations that likely prevent this 
reform in Part IV.  
By way of preface, I do not argue that adopting Section 702 into the 
domestic context will solve the problem of domestic terrorism. Indeed, 
even if passed, its implementation would face significant practical 
challenges for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Rather, the goal 
of this paper is to encourage the intelligence community to consider 
whether foreign intelligence tools are appropriate for combating domestic 
terrorism. It may be that federal criminal statutes already provide the 
needed tools to address the pendulum's return to domestic terror. Be that 
as it may, the goal of this proposal is more than mere navel-gazing—I 
simply hope to inspire a fresh conversation on what our Constitution 
allows, despite our political reservations. 
II. DOMESTICATING SECTION 702: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
In December of 2018, Dakota Reed adorned his Seattle bedroom 
with white supremacist propaganda.11 With this as a backdrop, Reed 
recorded himself holding two AR-15’s while announcing he was “fixing to 
shoot up” a local school.12 He posted this video on Facebook. Only a 
month prior, Reed wrote on his Facebook wall that he was “shooting for 
                                                     
10 See generally The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A, OFF. OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE 
(Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for%20Publicati
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/THW4-LNRV]; see also Section 702 Overview, OFF. OF DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-Basics-Infographic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S5HV-582L]. 
11 Goldman, supra note 1. 
12 Id. 
4
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30 Jews.”13 The FBI investigated Reed. Finding the threat too vague, they 
passed his case off to local law enforcement.14 Reed pled guilty to making 
bomb threats and served a one-year sentence.15 
According to the New York Times, Reed’s case highlights typical 
limits on the FBI’s domestic terrorism efforts: “Agents cannot always rely 
on federal law, unlike in so-called international terrorism cases where 
statutes were enacted to address the threat after the 9/11 attacks. Instead, 
the FBI often turns to local prosecutors to charge people they are 
concerned might be planning domestic attacks.”16 The proposal outlined 
in this paper can close one of these gaps in federal law. Using FISA’s 
Section 702 model, Congress could pass legislation allowing the FBI to 
target potential domestic terrorists that trigger an Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
system integrated on social media platforms. The AI system would be built 
on already-existing FBI behavioral analytics. Once a suspect triggers this 
system, the FBI would have a legal basis to engage in upstream and 
selector surveillance of that individual. 
A. Section 702—A Foreign-Target Surveillance Tool 
Due to FISA’s clandestine nature, significant confusion and 
speculation exist around it. Section 702 provides no exception. The 
following section briefly summarizes Section 702 and the debate 
surrounding the scope of the FBI’s access (the “Backdoor Loophole”). 
In the FISA Amendments Acts of 2008, Congress added Section 702 
to authorize “sweeping and suspicionless programmatic surveillance 
targeting individuals outside the United States.”17 In essence, Section 702 
gave the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) oversight over “the 
surveillance, for foreign intelligence purposes, of foreigners overseas.”18 




16 See id. (“‘Law enforcement needs more effective tools,’ said Mary McCord, a former top 
national security prosecutor who has drafted a proposed statute to criminalize the stockpiling 
of weapons intended to be used in a domestic terrorist attack. ‘I recognize the very legitimate 
concerns of those in the civil rights community, but I would hope that their concerns could 
be addressed through oversight.’”). 
17 STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 305 (Rachel Barkow et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2016).  
18 Id. at 306. 
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Specifically, Section 702 affords the intelligence community two 
surveillance tools: “PRISM” and “upstream” data collection.19 First, 
PRISM collection allows the government to send a “selector” (e.g., an 
email address) to an electronic communications service provider in the 
United States (i.e., an Internet Service Provider (ISP)).20 Section 702 
compels the ISP to provide the National Security Agency (NSA) with all 
communication from that email address (or whatever selector the agency 
chose).21 PRISM only involves electronic communications—not telephone 
calls.22 While the NSA receives all communications collected through 
PRISM, it shares only limited portions of that information with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI.23 Second, Section 702 provides 
“upstream” data collection. Upstream differs from PRISM collection in 
multiple ways: (1) upstream compels assistance from providers controlling 
the “‘backbone’ over which . . . internet communications transit” rather 
than just the cooperation of ISP’s;24 (2) upstream collection includes 
telephone communications and electronic communications;25 and (3) only 
the NSA receives upstream communications.26 
In 2017, Congress limited upstream searches.27 For example, Section 
702 originally permitted “about” communications, whereby the NSA can 
collect communications including a selector of a targeted person. This 
means that when the NSA targets a selector, it can obtain any 
communications discussing that selector, rather than just communication 
“to” or “from” that selector.28 However, Congress revised this provision in 
                                                     
19 DAVID MEDINE ET AL., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON 
THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 






25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27  See Emma Kohse, Summary: The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-fisa-amendments-
reauthorization-act-2017 [https://perma.cc/A4BT-TPAN]. 
28 See Andrew Crocker & David Ruiz, How Congress's Extension of Section 702 May Expand 
the NSA's Warrantless Surveillance Authority, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/how-congresss-extension-section-702-may-expand-
nsas-warrantless-surveillance [https://perma.cc/ZK87-N5J6] (“Under downstream, the 
government requires companies like Google, Facebook, and Yahoo to turn over messages 
‘to’ and ‘from’ a selector—gaining access to things like emails and Facebook messages.”). 
6
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the 2017 renewal.29 That revision terminated the “about” communications 
searches unless the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Attorney 
General (AG) provide Congress with a thirty-day notice to renew the 
program.30 Section 702 also permits “multiple communications 
transactions.”31 This allows the NSA to collect any communications 
included in a thread “to,” “from,” or “about,” the selector, so long as one 
end of the communications transaction involves a non-U.S. foreign 
individual.32 
However, Congress placed various limitations on Section 702. First, 
Section 702 prohibits the intentional targeting of “United States persons.”33 
Of relevance here, the amendment proscribes surveillance of “any 
communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are 
known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”34 
In other words, Section 702 only permits targeted surveillance of non-U.S. 
citizens. 
Second, by its very placement in FISA, Section 702 remains subject 
to FISC review. Importantly, the FISC reviews the minimization 
procedures for the inadvertent collection of U.S. persons and any 
retention or dissemination procedures regarding that data.35 Additionally, 
the FISC ensures all surveillance procedures comply with both Section 
702 and the Fourth Amendment.36 
                                                     
29 See id.   
30 Id. (In 2017, Congress expressly terminated the “about communications” practice when it 
voted to reinstate Section 702).  
31 MEDINE ET AL., supra note 19, at 7. 
32 Id.  
33 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)–(5) (2018); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2018) (defining a “United 
States person” as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association a 
substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United 
States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as 
defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) [of this section].”).  
34 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) (2018). 
35 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 17, at 306. 
36 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2015) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 
1803) (“[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) . . . established a 
special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), to review the 
government's applications for orders permitting electronic surveillance.”). 
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B. The “Backdoor Loophole”—Section 702’s Current Domestic Use 
The Backdoor Loophole matters to the analysis because it 
demonstrates how confusion over processes can lead to erroneous 
conclusions of law. Clarifying these clandestine practices provides a subtle, 
yet important step to providing the FBI with necessary tools against 
domestic terrorism. 
Critics misunderstand the FBI’s access to Section 702 information 
and argue that Section 702’s drafters “overlooked how law enforcement 
uses intelligence information.”37 Specifically, critics allege that FBI officials 
examine Section 702 databases using “‘U.S. person identifiers’ (terms or 
indicators that are linked to a U.S. person),” arguing “[n]o search warrant 
is required to query such information.”38 Additionally, critics argue that, 
although Section 702 “imposes a low level of judicial scrutiny for the 
creation of the large pools of information in 702 databases,” there is no 
higher scrutiny for such targeted intrusion on that person’s “heightened 
privacy interest.”39 Thus, critics conclude that “[w]hile the standards for 
querying Section 702 data are well-suited for foreign intelligence purposes, 
they are woefully inadequate for law enforcement purposes.”40 However, 
these arguments confuse how FBI queries occur, and provide a limited 
presentation of the implicated law.  
Former FBI special agent Asha Rangappa has outlined two 
clarifications for how these queries occur. First, in 2011, the FBI 
developed the Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), which 
aggregates data from multiple government databases.41 Scholars suggest 
DIVS resulted from the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the 
intelligence community unify “their knowledge in a network-based 
information sharing system that transcends traditional government 
boundaries.”42 
                                                     
37 Mieke Eoyang & Gary Ashcroft, Why Electronic Surveillance Reform is Necessary, THIRD 





41 Asha Rangappa, Don’t Fall for the Hype: How the FBI’s Use of Section 702 Surveillance 
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Second, some of the Section 702 PRISM data is provided to the FBI 
through DIVS, comingled with all the data in DIVS.43 Section 702 data is 
explained as “‘federated’ within DIVS”:44 
This means that while a query may return a 702 
“hit”—i.e., an indication that FISA-related information 
related to the queried selector exists—neither the metadata 
nor the content of that communication is immediately 
accessible to all agents. Only agents who work national 
security cases, have gone through FISA training, and have 
the appropriate clearance levels may continue to access the 
full 702 data at this stage. Agents working “ordinary” 
criminal cases, who do not have this training and clearance, 
would need to have an agent with the appropriate FISA 
clearance access the 702 data, and only after obtaining 
approval from both her own supervisor and the national 
security agent’s supervisor to rerun the query.45 
 
Proponents of the Backdoor Loophole draw two important 
conclusions from this system. First, agents are not able to conduct Section 
702-only searches: “[T]here is no such thing as doing an independent, 
702-only ‘search,’ even just for surface connections between non-content 
selectors, or ‘metadata.’”46 Second, when the agent conducts the query, 
“she does not know whether or not the search will result in a 702 ‘hit.’”47 
Based on the foregoing, proponents argue that reform efforts requiring the 
FBI to show “relevance” for a “metadata query” fail to recognize there is 
“no such thing as a ‘metadata query.’”48 Thus, “[t]his policy would require 
the FBI to go to court for every single search its 14,000 agents conduct 
each day.”49 In daily practice, DIVS only returns data appropriate for the 
clearance level and need-to-know basis of the individual conducting the 
search. This screening process is automated according to the classified 
nature of the data and security clearance credentials associated with an 
agent’s profile.   
                                                     
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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C. The Proposal 
Section 702 provides a framework for advanced, constitutional 
surveillance of domestic terrorism. As a prevention tool, Section 702 
could provide the FBI with needed intelligence to intercept violent 
domestic acts before they occur. Specifically, Section 702 contains four 
fundamental categories that could be mirrored into the domestic realm: (a) 
targeted surveillance; (b) private sector participation; (c) limited timeframe; 
and (d) judicial oversight over targeting and mitigation procedures.50 These 
elements could be used to build a domestic terrorism prevention statute 
that complies with constitutional limits on surveillance.  
1.  Targeted Surveillance 
Section 702 authorizes the AG and DNI to “target[] persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire 
foreign intelligence information.”51 Such targeting is limited to non-U.S. 
persons located outside of the United States and cannot be used to gain 
information about either a U.S. person or any person located inside the 
U.S.52 Section 702(b) is controversial because the electronic 
communications of U.S. persons are still being acquired inadvertently if 
such U.S. persons communicate with a foreign target under surveillance.53 
                                                     
50 50 U.S.C §§ 1881a(b)(1)–(3) (2018) (discussing targeted surveillance); 1881a(h)(2)(A)(vi) 
(outlining private sector participation); 1881a(a) (explaining limited time frame); 
1881a(d)(2)–(e) (providing judicial review and minimization procedures). 
51 Foreign Intelligence Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C § 1881a(a) (2008). 
52 § 1881a(b)(1)–(4).  
53 See Robyn Greene, Unintentional Noncompliance and the Need for Section 702 Reform, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/unintentional-noncompliance-and-
need-section-702-reform [https://perma.cc/7UHT-QJKE] (“This most recent query 
violation is part of a long history of inadvertent improper searches of Section 702-acquired 
data for U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons’ communications alike.”). But see Shreve Ariail, 
The High Stakes of Misunderstanding Section 702 Reforms, LAWFARE (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/high-stakes-misunderstanding-section-702-reforms 
[https://perma.cc/P9V7-YTGW]. Ariail states:  
To the extent that anyone might suggest that the law on incidental interception is “unsettled” 
(which it is not) it is also worth considering, as Judge Gleeson did in United States v. 
Hasbajrami the Supreme Court’s ruling in this area . . . . Other courts to address the 
incidental interception issue in other contexts have found similarly and no meaningful 
distinction between the constitutionality of incidental interception under the Section 702 
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Similarly, Congress should pass language, with limitations, providing 
the FBI with targeting tools for U.S. persons likely to engage in domestic 
terrorism. As under FISA, no U.S. person should be targeted, “solely 
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.”54 However, 
if it is possible to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens while at 
the same time protecting their lives, should we not strive for such a 
solution? 
One FBI agent recommends the use of AI on social media platforms 
to predict signs of imminent danger.55 In 2017, the FBI’s National Center 
for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) and Behavioral Threat 
Assessment Center published findings of behavioral analytics of violent 
persons.56 The report states: 
By engaging in the assessment and management 
process as soon as a person of concern is identified, threat 
managers are more likely to succeed in preventing a 
violent outcome. Steering a person in a different direction 
early on may mean offering assistance to someone who 
needs it before that person concludes violence is 
necessary.57 
 
Specifically, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) mapped 
certain traits and characteristics of individuals who have committed some 
act of mass or extreme violence.58 Recognizing there may be no exhaustive 
list of such traits and characteristics, the report distinguishes “risk factors” 
from “warning behaviors,” which, when combined, could predict potential 
acts of violence.59 
                                                     
 
54 Foreign Intelligence Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C § 1805(a) (2008). 
55 Interview with Anonymous FBI Agent (Nov. 19, 2019) (on file with the author). The FBI 
has in fact already explored AI’s policing capabilities. See, e.g., Robert Davidson, Automated 
Threat Detection and the Future of Policing, LEB (Aug. 8, 2019) 
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/automated-threat-detection-and-the-future-of-
policing [https://perma.cc/Y9RT-89XY]. 
56  See generally MOLLY AMMAN ET AL., FBI, MAKING PREVENTION A REALITY: 
IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING THE THREAT OF TARGETED ATTACKS (2017), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view 
[https://perma.cc/Q7LA-TN4M]. 
57 Id. at 5. 
58 Id. at 21 (“Threat assessment is a multifaceted process, stemming from a holistic analysis 
of the pattern of behaviors displayed by a person of concern.”). 
59 Id. at 29–32.  
11
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Risk factors involve “existing realities about the person of concern 
that may increase the risk of violence he poses in a given situation.”60 Such 
factors include violence exposure, mental health, weapon access, 
problematic behavioral history, and social/environmental concerns.61 
Conversely, warning behaviors are “dynamic and represent changes in 
patterns of behavior that may be evidence of increasing or accelerating 
risk.”62 Categorically, these behaviors include pathways to violence, 
fixation, identity (i.e., taking on a pseudo-warrior identity), novel 
aggression, energy burst, leakage (communicating intent to harm a third 
person), directly communicated threats, approach (i.e., attempts to gain 
access to, or surveillance of, a targeted location), end-of-life planning, and 
last-resort behaviors.63 
Analyzing these behaviors allows the FBI to determine the threat 
levels of various individuals. The FBI compares this threat assessment 
system to the weather assessment system of the National Weather Service 
(NWS).64 For example, when monitoring tornadoes, the NWS uses 
weather patterns to predict if conditions require: (i) no message, (ii) a 
tornado watch, or (iii) a tornado warning.65 When the chance of a tornado 
is not “measurably above the base rate,” the NWS remains silent on 
tornado updates (no message).66 But when conditions are just right, the 
NWS will alter its alert to either “watch” or “warning.”67 Similarly, the 
BAU adopts a similar structure to determine: (i) the appropriate level of 
concern; and (ii) how imminent that concern may be.68 The FBI’s report 
states, “[a] concern level does not predict violence likelihood but rather 
expresses the extent to which conditions may facilitate violence 
potential.”69 
The report goes on to discuss the fact that many of these behaviors 
are evidenced through social media and electronic communication. Social 
media leakage, once located, “can be a very effective source of information 
regarding the person’s mindset and future plans. Social media review 
                                                     
60 Id. at 29. 
61 Id. at 29–32. 
62 Id. at 32.  
63 Id. at 32–36. 
64 Id. at 23. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 




Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss5/4
1134 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:5 
 
 1134 
should begin as soon as a case is opened and continue until concerns are 
abated.”70 
Behavioral analytics on social media accounts has already existed for 
several years through the use of AI.71 Today, it is commonly used to detect 
advertising opportunities,72 remove “hateful accounts,”73 and even analyze 
and predict terrorist recruiting and public relations behavior.74 
Integrating AI and the behavioral analytics already established at the 
FBI could provide a non-content-based solution to targeting U.S. citizens. 
If the FBI can integrate its current threat forecasting scheme into an AI 
software, then Congress could grant the FBI the capabilities to target U.S. 
persons based on that threat determination, rather than on the content of 
that person’s conduct or speech. Such a red flag “warning” could provide 
the FBI with a sufficient basis to secure a warrant for the target’s electronic 
communications on that social media platform.75 The idea is to provide 
the FBI with proactive tools that constitutionally protect U.S. citizens from 
other U.S. citizens.  
                                                     
70 Id. at 50. According to this report,  
A study of targeted violence incidents at schools revealed that in over 75% of the cases studied 
at least one person had information that the offense was being planned. Most were peers, 
such as a friend, a schoolmate, or a sibling. Some peers knew about the plan because the 
offender “leaked” it. Leakage on social media could take the form of writings, images, videos, 
and even “likes.” An example of social media leakage occurred in a European case. Hours 
before a 2011 assault on a youth camp, the offender posted a video online which appeared 
to advocate violence toward specific religious and political groups. About 90 minutes before 
his offense, he posted a 1,500+ page “manifesto” online, describing two years of preparation 
for violence. It is worth noting that neither of these posts included a direct threat. 
 
Id.  
71 See Tina Shahid, Social Media AI: How Did the History of AI Lead Up to It?, SYNTHESIO 
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.synthesio.com/blog/social-media-ai-history-of-ai/ 
[https://perma.cc/94BE-HL82].  
72 See 9series Solutions, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Social Media, MYSTORY 
(June 7, 2019), https://yourstory.com/mystory/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-social-
me [https://perma.cc/J9PL-UQM9].  
73 Id. 
74 DANIEL ZENG ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS AND INTELLIGENCE 14 (IEEE Computer 
Society, 2010), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5678581 
[https://perma.cc/5DBP-VNK7]. 
75 This assumes no “public safety” exception would apply to the warrant requirement. See 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (stating “warrants are generally required . . 
. unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”). 
13
Carmack: My Brother's Keeper: Using the Intelligence Toolbox on Domestic T
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
2020] MY BROTHER’S KEEPER  1135 
 
 
2.  Private Sector Participation 
Section 702 mandates private companies, such as ISPs, to comply 
with FISA requests for electronic communications.76 The government 
compensates these companies for their compliance and absolves them of 
any liability that may result.77 Finally, Section 702 provides these electronic 
communication service providers with an opportunity to challenge such 
intelligence directives under the Fourth Amendment.78 
This same structure can be applied to social media companies. For 
example, this statute proposed in this article would include language 
requiring social media companies to integrate AI software that is based on 
the FBI’s preexisting behavioral indicators of imminent violence. 
Essentially, this would automate and de-humanize the process of 
determining threatening behavior.79 
Like Section 702, Congress should require the ongoing transfer of 
“red flags” to the FBI. Using the NWS example above, when Facebook’s 
“domestic terror AI” flags a person as a “tornado warning,” that signal 
would be immediately available to the FBI for further investigation. 
Additionally, the new statute should provide the same protections to social 
media companies that Section 702 provides to electronic communications 
companies. The FBI could compensate social media companies for the 
cost of transferring and providing the data. It could also provide protection 
from any civil liability arising from the data sharing. 
3.  Limited Timeframe 
Under Section 702, an order permitting the DNI and AG to target 
non-U.S. persons only survives for one year.80 This limitation prevents 
boundless and open surveillance on foreign persons by requiring the 
agencies to maintain certifications of relevance on an annual basis.81 
Should Congress pass a statute mandating early AI detection, several 
methods of time limitation arise. First, Congress could limit the “front 
end” of the investigation. For example, once the FBI receives a “red flag 
                                                     
76 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1), (5) (2018). 
77 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)–(3). 
78 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4), (6). 
79 See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make 
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2003) (“The automated analysis of 
potentially relevant transactional data while shielding the exposure of individual identity to a 
generalized search protects privacy by maintaining anonymity, which in turn preserves 
autonomy.”).  
80 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).  
81 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(F). 
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warning” from a social media’s AI platform, the statute could limit how 
long the FBI has to secure a warrant. This would prevent the FBI from 
retroactively seeking a warrant from somebody who triggered a “warning” 
status at a previous time, but currently no longer does. Second, the statute 
could limit the “back end” of the investigation. This would limit a court 
order allowing the FBI to investigate a suspect’s electronic 
communications to a specific timeframe (e.g., one year, similar to Section 
702 limitations).  
4.  Judicial Review 
Section 702 provides judicial review for both the submitted 
certifications for surveillance and the procedures used during the 
investigation to ensure compliance with FISA.82 Furthermore, Section 702 
provides appeals processes to review the FISC’s initial determination.83 
Congress could similarly provide for judicial review of the FBI’s 
certification through an Article III court and subject it to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. “Domestic terrorism,” while defined in a 
criminal statute, carries no criminal penalties.84 This is because, so far, all 
acts of domestic terrorism have been covered by criminal law.85 
Consequently, Article III courts are adequate for reviewing the 
constitutionality of a domestic surveillance search. 
Additionally, Congress should grant the court jurisdiction over the 
FBI’s domestic surveillance procedures, based on its authority granted 
under Article III of the Constitution. Section 702 expressly enumerates 
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures as subject to FISC 
jurisdiction.86 Similarly, Congress should outline the appropriate 
procedures for targeting and minimization procedures for domestic 
surveillance and subject those procedures to judicial review.  
                                                     
82 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j).  
83 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(4).  
84 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). But see Barbara McQuade, Proposed Bills Would Help Combat 
Domestic Terrorism, LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposed-
bills-would-help-combat-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/UA2P-N7QC] (“[Proposed 
legislation making domestic terrorism a crime] would provide much-needed tools to federal 
agents and prosecutors who sometimes find themselves without adequate means for 
addressing domestic terrorism.”). 
85 See Robert Chesney, Should We Create a Federal Crime of “Domestic Terrorism”?, 
LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-we-create-federal-crime-
domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/K6XF-2DFE] (“We do not have a situation in which 
persons who are involved in terrorist attacks somehow end up walking free, or getting 
improperly light sentences, due to a gap in the scope or calibration of criminal laws.”). 
86 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2).  
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In summary, the language of Section 702 affords Congress a structure 
utilizing limited surveillance measures to prevent acts of domestic 
terrorism. If national leaders prioritized this issue over their political 
safety, they would quickly learn there is room for both common sense 
domestic safety policy and constitutional liberties. 
Authorizing the FBI to access Section 702 data is likely a necessary, 
yet insufficient, tool for solving the problem of domestic terrorism. The 
concept of sharing such information raises questions of boundaries as to 
constitutional and political limitations. Those limitations are addressed in 
turn in the following sections.  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC USE OF 
SECTION 702 
James Manson leads an organization called the “Atomwaffen,” a 
group Vox describes as a “particularly radical alt-right group . . . openly 
encouraging supporters to plan and commit ‘lone wolf’ attacks on African 
Americans, Jews, and other minority groups.”87 Manson authored Siege, a 
newsletter published between 1980 to 1986, urging his readers to engage 
in “individual acts of violence,” which “could add up, destabilizing the 
American political system and bringing on a race war.”88 
In 2015, Dylann Roof responded to Manson’s call for individual acts 
of violence when he opened fire in a black church in Charleston, South 
Carolina, killing nine people.89 He did so with “the explicit intent of 
sparking a ‘race war’ [in America].”90 Two researchers at the Anti-
Defamation League have reported four examples of individuals motivated 
by Roof to commit similar acts.91 One of the individuals said that he 
wanted to “pull a Dylann Roof,” and “make the news some more and 
                                                     
87 Zack Beauchamp, An Online Subculture Celebrating the Charleston Church Shooter 




89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91  Hardcore White Supremacists Elevate Dylann Roof to Cult Hero Status, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/hardcore-white-
supremacists-elevate-dylann-roof-to-cult-hero-status [https://perma.cc/RE42-2VZD]. 
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shoot some Jews.”92 Permeating social media sites, Roof’s followers 
(referred to as the Bowl Gang) spread continued calls to violence in the 
name of the new “race war.”93 
This section identifies when these statements invoke presidential and 
congressional war powers. Next, it examines constitutional protections 
U.S. citizens maintain against those war powers. Specifically, this section 
considers whether: (1) an automated AI alert to the FBI constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search; and (2) such threatening speech falls under 
the First Amendment’s protection.  
A.  Limits on Constitutional Powers: War Powers 
The Prize Cases provide perspective on these questions during the 
Civil War.94 While Congress recessed in 1861, President Lincoln ordered 
a blockade of Southern ports after Southern forces attacked Fort 
Sumpter.95 Union forces then captured four neutral vessels that allegedly 
violated the blockade.96 The defendants argued they were mere 
“insurgents” or “traitors” rather than “belligerents” or “enemies,” 
proscribing the usual consequences of war.97 The owners of these vessels 
argued this conflict did not constitute traditional criteria for war, as the 
conflict did not arise between nations.98 
The Court responded by clarifying that Article II vests the “whole 
Executive power” in the Presidency.99 The court interpreted that power as 
not only licensing the President to respond to foreign threats but binding 
him “to resist force by force," that is, “to accept the challenge without 
waiting for any special legislative authority.”100 Important for our purposes, 
the Court clarified that “whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or 
States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the 
declaration of it be ‘unilateral.’”101 The Court also highlighted the fact that 
Congress ratified President Lincoln’s actions, arguing such ratification 
                                                     
92 Beauchamp, supra note 87; see also Hardcore White Supremacists Elevate Dylann Roof 
to Cult Hero Status, supra note 91. 
93 Id. 
94 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862). 
95 Id. at 637. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 667. 
98 Id. 
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supported the argument that “war” existed. Therefore, Lincoln’s actions 
were constitutionally permitted.102 Consequently, the Court deferred to the 
President’s characterization of the conflict as a “civil war” and the 
defendants as “belligerents” because this characterization was a “question 
to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions 
and acts of the political department of the Government to which this 
power was entrusted.”103 
The “War on Terror” follows the Prize Cases’ recipe for proscribing 
war. Commentators have argued the presidential war powers and their 
congressional ratification through the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) are limited because Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not 
traditional nation-state enemies.104 But as other academics have noted, the 
peculiarity of the war opponent has not prevented previous use of 
presidential war powers.105 The Mexican-American War, Civil War, and 
Spanish-American War all required military engagement with military 
opponents maintaining “no formal connection to the state enemy.”106 
Additionally, other past authorizations of force have been directed at non-
military officials or state actors “such as slave traders, pirates, and Indian 
tribes.”107 
It follows, then, that Congress’ ability to declare war, and the 
President’s ability to prosecute war, are not limited to traditional notions of 
state actors engaged in open warfare against the United States. However, 
does the Constitution permit executing such powers against U.S. citizens? 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court considered whether the war powers 
of the Constitution could be applied against a United States citizen.108 
Specifically, the Court considered whether a United States citizen 
maintained a right to habeas corpus despite his detainment as an enemy 
combatant. There, the Court held that “[w]hatever power the United 
                                                     
102 See id. at 671 (noting Congress ratified the President’s action).  
103 Id. at 670 (“The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the 
Court that a state or war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a 
measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.”). 
104 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032–34 
(2004) (noting that “[t]he wars with Afghanistan and Iraq were wars; the struggle against 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is not.”); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 953 (2002).  
105 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2067 (2005). 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 2066. 
108 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
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States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other 
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake.”109 Because of Hamdi’s U.S. citizenship and right to due process, the 
Hamdi court refused to apply the Constitution’s war powers against the 
defendant.110 
Hamdi stands for the proposition that even if Congress has 
sanctioned the President to “resist force by force,” such force may not be 
applied to a United States citizen without the courts’ involvement.111 
Therefore, to the extent domestic terrorism involves U.S. citizens, any 
“force” against those citizens may not be granted without a blessing from 
all three branches of government.112 In other words, even if Congress 
granted and the Executive approved some sort of force against domestic 
terrorism, U.S. citizens are still entitled to due process.113 While Congress 
has not explicitly proscribed the intelligence community to war against 
domestic terrorism, this backdrop informs the Constitutional limits on 
congressional and executive war powers. 
In light of the Prize Cases and Hamdi, it follows that the President 
has the authority to “resist force by force”; however, when applied to U.S. 
citizens, such force is subject to a court’s determination of due process. 
Thus, if Congress decides to authorize the Executive to apply foreign 
intelligence tools against U.S. citizens, that authorization must be subject to 
judicial scrutiny. 
As outlined above, by adopting Section 702’s judicial review 
language, the statute proposed in this paper satisfies Hamdi’s required 
judicial scrutiny. By providing both a “front-end” judicial review of the 
FBI’s warrant request for electronic communications and a “back end” 
                                                     
109 Id. at 536. But see United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich., 
Southern Division (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (“Implicit in [the President's War 
Powers] duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or 
overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this duty, the President—through the 
Attorney General—may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain 
intelligence information on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the 
Government.”). 
110 Id. at 2651. 
111 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581–83 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 535. 
113 But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 38 (discussing the legality of drone strikes 
against U.S.-citizen terrorist, al-Aulaqi) (“Because al-Aulaqi is a U.S. citizen, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, likely protects him 
in some respects even while he is abroad.”). 
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judicial review of the FBI’s procedures, a domestic version of Section 702 
would provide extensive judicial scrutiny, preventing overreach of 
presidential and congressional war powers.  
B.  Constitutional Liberties: First and Fourth Amendment 
Considerations 
United States v. United States District Court, otherwise known as the 
“Keith case,” remains the leading authority on domestic surveillance.114 
Decided before the enactment of FISA, the Keith court refused to extend 
a “national security” exception to the warrant requirement for domestic 
surveillance. 
1.  Keith v. Proposed Domestic Terrorism Statute: Factual 
Distinctions 
Despite Keith’s assumed applicability to domestic surveillance 
questions, its factual distinctions from current domestic terrorism compel 
different legal conclusions concerning the scope of domestic surveillance. 
First, Keith arose when U.S. citizens bombed a CIA office in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.115 That is, Keith arose when U.S. citizens enacted violence 
against their own government. In contrast, the domestic terrorism 
currently imperiling the United States involves acts of violence targeting 
innocent U.S. citizens. While subtle, this factual distinction impacts First 
Amendment considerations. 
Second, in Keith, the government wiretapped the defendants’ 
communications without a warrant.116 There, the defendants’ 
communications were private phone conversations.117 They were not 
public communications. The statutory language suggested in this paper 
would determine risks based on language and data placed into public 
discourse. 
Third, and perhaps most critically, Keith was decided before 9/11. 
Consequently, Keith analyzed the FBI’s actions through a lens of 
traditional law enforcement, rather than through the “prevention” lens 
                                                     
114 United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich. (Keith) 407 U.S. 297 
(1972); see Chesney, supra note 85 (“There has not been any significant appetite, since the 
1970s, for crafting a purely domestic surveillance system along the lines the Supreme Court 
suggested in the famous Keith case.”). 
115 Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.  
116 Id. at 300–01.  
117 Id. at 299. 
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established by the 9/11 Commission Report.118 The proposed domestic 
terrorism statute arises from the intelligence community’s new prevention 
charge. While human rights are not subject to the changing needs of 
government, the law makes clear that certain rights are abrogated by 
certain actions (e.g., murder may deprive a citizen of her right to liberty, or 
even life). The question here is whether public disregard for human life 
can create a legal basis for the government to engage in preventive 
measures. 
2. Fourth Amendment Distinctions 
These factual distinctions compel different legal conclusions. First, 
the government's actions in Keith clearly constituted a “search,” whereas 
the surveillance proposed in this paper would not. Second, even if the 
proposed amendment constituted a search, post-Keith Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has provided applicable exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.  
To begin, while the government’s actions in Keith clearly constitute a 
Fourth Amendment “search,” the proposed amendment does not. Only 
six years before Keith, Katz v. United States ruled that federal wiretaps of 
phone conversations violated the Fourth Amendment.119 Before Katz, the 
legal test for whether a search had occurred was whether the government 
physically trespassed onto a person’s “constitutionally protected area.”120 
Katz transitioned the test to consider whether the government violated a 
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”121 In 2012, United States v. 
Jones held that both tests are appropriate for determining whether a 
Fourth Amendment search occurred.122 
However, subsequent cases have held that government intrusions on 
social media sites do not constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. In 2011, the City of New York charged Malcom Harris with 
disorderly conduct for his involvement in “Occupy Wall Street.” There, 
the court held “[t]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
                                                     
118 THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE HAMILTON, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 364 (Authorized 
ed. 2004). 
119  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and 
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
120 See id. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928)). 
121 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
122 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012). 
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tweet sent around the world. . . . So long as the third party is in possession 
of the materials, the court may issue an order for the materials from the 
third party when the materials are relevant and evidentiary.”123 The court 
for the U.S. District of Georgia followed suit in a case involving Facebook, 
holding “[the defendant] fails to acknowledge the lack of privacy afforded 
her by her selected Facebook setting. While [defendant] may select her 
Facebook friends, she cannot select her Facebook friends’ friends . . . 
[making] her page available to potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of 
people whom she did not know.”124  
The proposed statute does not suggest that the FBI should monitor 
all social media profiles for clues of criminal activity. Rather, the statute 
merely proposes public-private partnerships that alert the FBI to 
conditions ripe for violence. These alerts are rooted in behavioral analytics 
the FBI already uses to determine violence and the imminence thereof. 
Further, these alerts are used for preventive, not prosecutorial, evidence-
gathering purposes. The alerts merely provide a proactive means to alert 
the FBI to potential dangers, causing warrants to be obtained sooner than 
they otherwise may have been able to. 
Second, even if an AI alerting system constituted a “search,” it falls 
within the “public safety” exception to the warrant requirement. Keith held 
the government’s domestic surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment 
because judicial approval occurred after the surveillance already occurred. 
The government argued that a “special circumstances” exception should 
be applied to the warrant requirement, given the distinctions between 
“domestic security” and criminal cases.125 The Court rejected this 
argument, holding: 
The circumstances described do not justify complete 
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior 
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose 
be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, 
risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of 
speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive 
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security 
concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of 
intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such 
                                                     
123 People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593–94 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703[d]; People v. Carassavas, 426 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Saratoga Cty. Ct. 1980)).  
124 Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2013). 
125 United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S. 
297, 318–19 (1972). 
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss5/4
1144 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:5 
 
 1144 
surveillances to oversee political dissent.126 
 
Admittedly, not until the 1978 Mincey v. Arizona decision (six years 
after Keith) did the U.S. Supreme Court expand the “exigent 
circumstance” warrant exception to include public safety.127 However, 
Mincey adopted a 1969 case from the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia to expand the exception, which would have been available to 
Keith as well.128 Regardless, Keith only recognized a limited number of 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: “[searches that] serve the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-being and 
preserve evidence from destruction.”129 “Public safety” provides the very 
basis for the proposed statute. Falling squarely within the language of 
Mincey, the proposed amendment provides proactive alerts to the FBI of 
conditions that threaten public safety. Therefore, no warrant should be 
necessary for the AI alerts.  
To suggest Keith forecloses any opportunity to conduct domestic 
surveillance based on a domestic version of Section 702 is to 
misunderstand the aforementioned factual and legal distinctions between 
Keith and the proposed statute. Keith’s holding may make sense in light of 
the government’s surveillance involved there; however, it fails to reach a 
domestic version of Section 702 that would target U.S. citizens based on 
warning indicators arising from public social media posts. Keith left the 
door open for Congress to apply surveillance techniques against “domestic 
security” that differ from those used in traditional criminal law: 
Given those potential distinctions between Title III 
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic 
security, Congress may wish to consider protective 
standards for the latter which differ from those already 
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different 
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment 
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need 
of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens.130 
 
                                                     
126 Id. at 320. 
127 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 
205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is 
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”). 
128 Id. (adopting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212).  
129 Keith, 407 U.S. at 318. 
130 Id. at 322–23. 
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Based on the foregoing, the domestic version of Section 702, as 
outlined in this paper, would reasonably relate to the “legitimate need of 
Government for intelligence” and the “protected rights of our citizens.” 
3. First Amendment Distinctions 
As the court explained in Keith, “National security cases, moreover, 
often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not 
present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”131 Justice Powell cited Senator Gary 
Hart’s speech, expressing First Amendment concerns with domestic 
surveillance in the name of national security: 
As I read it—and this is my fear—we are saying that 
the President, on his motion, could declare—name your 
favorite poison—draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku 
Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.132 
 
As the Keith court went on to say, “The price of lawful public dissent 
must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. 
Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous 
citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private 
conversation.”133 
The FBI addressed this concern in its 2017 Behavior Analysis Unit 
report.134 Specifically, the report concludes: “As a threat assessment 
strategy, monitoring a person of concern’s communications is sometimes 
recommended; these may include publicly accessible social media or 
weblog (‘blog’) posts.”135 As the report highlights, however, the 
constitutional right to free speech does not extend to all forms of 
expression.136 Particularly, the FBI points out “true threats” as a form of 
unprotected speech.137 The report defines a “true threat” as intending “to 
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence 
                                                     
131 Id. at 313. 
132 Id. at 314 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14750) (statement of Sen. Hart) (“The subsequent 
assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511(3) implied no statutory grant, 
contraction, or definition of presidential power eased the Senator’s misgivings.”).  
133 Id.  
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against an individual or group; he need not intend to carry out the 
threat.”138 
The report also recognizes the FBI must have “authorized purposes” 
for monitoring someone’s speech. One authorized purpose is “trying to 
determine whether a person is exhibiting behaviors that pose a concern for 
significant and imminent violence.”139 It follows that using AI to monitor 
conditions for “significant and imminent” violence falls within First 
Amendment boundaries. Such a tool removes the FBI from “monitoring” 
speech. Rather, it informs the FBI, based on its own behavior analytics 
already in place, of early threats. It screens surveillance from being 
unequally applied based on political dissent or persuasion. Instead, the 
proposed language allows an objective “third party” to detect conditions 
ripe for concern, based on science-based factors of violence.  
Conclusion 
In summary, the proposed statute stands on all fours within 
constitutional limits on the executive branch and individual liberties. 
Additionally, the proposal is completely on point with balancing individual 
liberties and public safety. While Keith necessarily governs the limits on 
domestic surveillance, it explicitly leaves open the possibility for the type 
of surveillance considered here. 
IV. UNDERCURRENTS IN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
Despite the constitutionality of this article’s proposal, the 
fearmongering of politics will likely defeat it. One commentator notes that 
while he has “not seen anyone calling for an attempt to create a 
domestically focused analogue to . . . something akin to Section 702,” such 
a proposal could “pass constitutional muster according to . . . Keith,” but 
“smacks of authoritarianism.”140 The commentator correctly identifies 
political concerns over appearing “authoritarian.” However, this provides a 
mere cursory explanation of the political concern. Instead, competing 
policy perspectives have arguably created three specific “tensions” 
surrounding questions of domestic terrorism in the intelligence 
community. 
These tensions have confused and ultimately frustrated sound policy 
developments to address domestic terrorism. First, legal distinctions 
between foreign and domestic terrorism fail to reflect their factual 
                                                     
138 Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (emphasis added).   
139 Id. at 20. 
140 See Chesney, supra note 85. 
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similarities. Second, after 9/11, the intelligence community faces new 
pressures to prevent atrocities, rather than merely prosecute those who 
commit them. Finally, inter-agency information sharing after 9/11 pulls 
domestic resources into international counterterrorism, without 
reciprocation. 
A.  Foreign/Domestic Terrorism Distinctions 
First, legal distinctions between foreign and domestic terrorism fail to 
reflect their factual similarities. On the one hand, these distinctions make 
sense. Most obviously, foreign terrorism often (though certainly not 
always) involves non-U.S. citizens. Thus, any counterterrorism efforts are 
limited by statutory rights afforded to non-U.S. persons—not by the 
Constitution.  This was especially obvious during questions of habeas 
corpus, detention, torture, and military tribunals. 
Additionally, foreign acts of terror invoke different laws than acts of 
domestic terror.  Foreign terrorism can implicate any number of 
international or humanitarian laws. Conversely, domestic terrorism 
involves acts usually criminalized by federal or state law.141 
On the other hand, there are a few factual distinctions between 
foreign and domestic terrorism. Both involve acts of violence in the name 
of a higher call or mission. Both represent extremities in their higher call. 
Both draw significant attention due to the extensive damages and deaths 
they often create. Former FBI special agent Ali Soufan summarized this 
tension: 
America’s law enforcement agencies, intelligence 
community and court system all treat these two scenarios 
differently. Those differences in treatment mask instructive 
similarities between these two forms of organized hate. 
Having spent almost 25 years fighting jihadi terrorism here 
and abroad, I see disturbing parallels between the rise of 
Al Qaeda in the 1990s and that of racist terrorism today.142 
 
The degree of legal separation assumes a degree of factual distinction 
that does not exist between foreign and domestic terrorism. Consequently, 
policymakers hesitate to narrow the legal distinctions for fear of public 
                                                     
141 See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” 
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2019). 
142 Ali H. Soufan, I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different. 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-
terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/V89D-KRX9]. 
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scrutiny or constitutional intrusions. In sum, this fear prevents the pursuit 
of effective reform. 
B.  From Prosecution to Prevention 
Second, after 9/11, the intelligence community faces new pressures to 
prevent atrocities, rather than merely prosecute those who commit them. 
In the 9/11 Commission Report, the Commission argues future 
intelligence efforts “should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is 
as much, or more, political as it is military.”143 
The intelligence community’s renewed focus on prevention 
expanded to the FBI—a new focus for an organization that traditionally 
sees itself as a law enforcement agency. In 2004, then-FBI Director Robert 
Mueller summarized this shift:   
Nearly a century ago, the FBI was created to 
investigate criminal activity that had begun to cross county 
and state lines . . . . Immediately following 9/11, the FBI’s 
number one priority became the prevention of terrorist 
attacks. This required a systematic approach examining all 
aspects of Bureau operations . . . . [including] how we 
disseminate our intelligence information.144 
 
Four years after 9/11, the Los Angeles Times published an article 
titled, Go on the Offensive Against Terror.145 Calling for expansive 
intelligence efforts and the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act, the article 
reflects a shift in American expectations on its intelligence community: do 
not just find the bad guys; keep them from ever doing this again. 
Failure to recognize this shift in the intelligence community frustrates 
reasonable surveillance policy discussions. If we understood that some 
surveillance was used to prevent harm rather than criminalize behavior, we 
might be more comfortable with discussing reasonable solutions.  
                                                     
143 KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 364. 
144 Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director, Speaker at the Kansas State University Landon 
Lecture Series (Apr. 13, 2004), https://www.k-
state.edu/media/newsreleases/landonlect/muellertext404.html [https://perma.cc/7WWK-
4X6X]. 
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C.  Foreign Tools Unavailable for Domestic Terrorism 
Finally, inter-agency information sharing after 9/11 pulls domestic 
resources into international counterterrorism, without reciprocation. 
According to former FBI Director Mueller, “Today, criminal and terrorist 
threats increasingly have [] international dimension[s]. . . . By September 
11, 2001, we knew the world . . . was growing smaller and more 
interconnected in an evolving crime landscape.”146 Consequently, as 
Mueller summarizes, “The age of global threats has moved the Bureau 
into an age of global partnerships.”147 
But as the threat pendulum swings back to domestic terrorism, tools 
available to fight against international terrorism have not been available to 
the FBI for a similar threat. Currently, the intelligence community enjoys 
legal latitude to deploy a series of tools against foreign terrorism. As stated 
in the introduction of this paper, material support statutes, drone strikes, 
and enhanced interrogation are all afforded to the foreign intelligence 
community.   
Post 9/11, some efforts to erode the “wall” between intelligence and 
criminal agencies have helped. For example, in 2001, President Bush’s 
Justice Department reformed FISA to make foreign intelligence only “a 
purpose” of a FISA application, rather than “the purpose.”148 While such 
steps reflect a willingness to support the FBI’s efforts, the intelligence 
community still preserves many institutional structures to resolve 
immediate problems. For example, the FBI’s FISA request may take up to 
four months to be approved.149 Furthermore, the request must still involve 
foreign intelligence, prohibiting FBI surveillance on individuals like 
Dakota Reed who threaten shootings at local schools. In sum, the 
Constitution allows for significant progress to be had in inter-agency 
communication and information sharing. 
V. CONCLUSION: TEAR DOWN THE WALL 
On September 11, 2001, the entire United States felt the smoke and 
debris that hovered over New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. 
The intelligence community stood stunned, wondering what it had missed. 
As reports of Massoui, Hazmi, and Mihdhar came to light, the intelligence 
                                                     
146 See Mueller, supra note 144.  
147 Id. 
148 See Inspector General Report, A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information 
Related to the September 11 Attacks (June 2006). 
149 Interview with Anonymous FBI Agent, supra note 55. 
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community faced the sickening reality that the “wall” between intelligence 
and criminal agencies provided terrorists with institutional support. 
But, if you ask the average citizen on the street what concerns them 
more: a foreign terrorist attack or a private citizen going rogue most would 
likely express fear of a domestic attack.150 In the wake of the El Paso and 
Dayton shootings, President Trump promised, “We can and will stop this 
evil contagion.”151 He directed the FBI to identify the necessary tools and 
said he would provide them with “whatever they need.” “We must shine 
light on the dark recesses of the Internet and stop mass murders before 
they start,” President Trump said.152 
While imperfect, the proposal in this paper may merely spark a 
discussion concerning what foreign tools could be constitutionally applied 
to domestic terrorism and be effective to that end. It provides a 
constitutional framework for preventive action while respecting civil 
liberties. If politics be its demise, I only hope that in the process, this 
proposal inspires conversations that support both our safety and individual 
freedoms. 
                                                     
150 See Vera Bergengruen & W.J. Hennigan, “We Are Being Eaten from Within.” Why 
America Is Losing the Battle Against White Nationalist Terrorism, TIME MAG. (Aug. 8, 
2019), https://time.com/5647304/white-nationalist-terrorism-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/3BXV-RJAD] (“White supremacy is a greater threat than international 
terrorism right now.”). 
151 Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President Trump on the Mass 
Shootings in Texas and Ohio (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-mass-shootings-texas-ohio [https://perma.cc/6WZF-
XE56]. 
152 Id.  
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